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Migration is one of the most important ways through which workers can improve their productivity and wages and increase their families" welfare. While the overall effects of migration on host and source countries alike seem to be beneficial, there have been through history fears of natives in host countries that migrants increase the unemployment among domestic workers and lower wages.
History is full of examples in which domestic workers took violent actions against immigrants in order to deter migration. Examples include the anti-immigrant violence in 19 th century New York, which was documented by Asbury (1927) , the recent violence against Hispanic migrants in the US, or the xenophobic violence in Eastern Germany after German re-unification.
It remains an open question how this form of violence affects migration and migration intentions. We here investigate how the migration flows from a developing region are affected by xenophobia and violent actions in a more developed host country. We investigate a hand-collected survey among more than 1000 households, collected in Mozambique in summer 2008, a few months after a series of xenophobic attacks in South Africa killed dozens and displaced tens of thousands of migrants from neighbouring countries. Our identification strategy is based on the comparison of migration intentions of Mozambicans before and after the attacks occurred in May 2008, and on the use of a placebo period in which no violence occurred. We control for differing characteristics of the household samples (from a wide range of survey demographic measurements) and previous migration behaviour.
We find that other things equal, the intention of the head of the household to migrate after the attacks is lower than before; it decreases from 37% to 33%. The sensitivity of migration intentions to violence is larger for household heads with many children younger than 15 years, decreasing the migration intention by 11% points. Evidently, people are not only concerned about their own health, but also about the welfare of their offspring. Most importantly, the sensitivity of migration intentions is highest for household who have many young children and little access to social networks. For such households the intention almost falls by 15% points. Social networks thus provide insurance against the consequences small children suffer when the household head is harmed by xenophobic violence and consequently cannot provide.
The small but growing body of literature on violence and migration has focused on outmigration decisions in environments of high level of violence (see Mesnard 2009 on out-migration flows from Colombia, for example). Yet, very little is known on how violence and xenophobic feelings in host countries affect migration intentions and behaviour in source countries. To the best of our knowledge this paper is the first that measures how violence or other types of xenophobic behaviour in host countries affect migration intentions, and to what extent social networks in the source country may provide insurance against the risks associated with migration.
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Our findings measure intentions to migrate. A host of papers has looked at migration intentions (for instance, Burda et al., 1998; Drinkwater and Ingram, 2008; Epstein and Gang, 2006; Fouarge and Ester, 2007; Lam, 2000; Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2004; Papapanagos and Sanfey, 2001; and Ubelmesser, 2006) . Manski (1990) has questioned the general use of migration intentions data as a proxy for actual migration, but emigration intentions have been shown to be a good predictor of future actual emigration behaviour (see, for example, van Dalen and Henkens, 2008) . It has also been argued that intentions are a monotonic function of the underlying driving variables that motivate migration (Burda et al.1998) . Finally, using migration intentions data avoids the sample selection difficulties that arise from the use of the host country data (see Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2004; van Dale and Henkens, 2008) .
Our results shows that violence in the host country reduces the intention to migrate.
Violence has the smallest effect on people who live in small households and have few children, and the largest on people with many household members whose family is badly connected to social networks. Migration intentions of household heads with large families who have a good social network are much less sensitive to violence than the ones with bad networks. This confirms that social networks are an important insurance mechanism in developing economies. However, the fact that better access to social networks reduces the sensitivity of migration intentions to violence although access to networks in Mozambique cannot provide protection against violence in South Africa, lends itself to the interpretation that migrant workers seem to care more about the future of their offspring than about their own health.
The next section provides the necessary background on the two economies, Mozambique and South Africa, on the xenophobic violence in 2008, and the role of family and networks in Mozambique. Section 2 presents an illustrative model, and Section 3 the data. Section 4 discusses our empirical strategy that builds on the difference between the before and after violence intention to migrate, and the comparison with a placebo period that cannot be affected by the violence.
Section 5 presents the main results, and Section 6 discusses a number of potential concerns about statistic identification. We then conclude.
Migration from Mozambique, violence, and the role of family and networks
Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world with a GDP per capita of $446 at current Mozambique has had slow economic growth until the beginning of the 1990s, poor levels of education, especially of women, low productivity and a lack of employment opportunities. Basic infrastructure is lacking in many rural areas, whence the isolation of communities and poor integration of rural-urban markets (AfDB/OECD, 2003 and 2008 Poor households in developing countries face substantial risk from multiple sources but have typically limited access to formal insurance and credit markets. They therefore have to resort to informal arrangements with other households. The theoretical literature suggests that small groups or networks (e.g. Genicot and Ray, 2003; Ambrus, Mobius and Szeidl, 2010) , with members who care for or trust each other and can punish reneging members, can achieve high levels of insurance (e.g. Altonji, Ayashi, and Kotliko, 1992; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; La Ferrara, 2003) . The empirical evidence from a set of developing countries is consistent with these predictions (Ligon 1998; Fafchamps and Lund 2003; Dubois, Jullien, and Magnac 2008; Ambrus, Mobius, and Szeidl 2009) . A relatively common presumption is that the extended family is the most important resourcesharing institution.
Yet, Coate and Ravallion (1993) argue that this is a rather "romanticized view" of kinshipbased sharing systems, and it has been shown that committing to enforcement is more difficult in homogenous kinship groups, where family obligations (the "family tax") are likely to play a role (Anderson and Francois 2006) . Recent empirical evidence considering endogenous formation of 6 risk sharing groups in an economic experiment concludes that "genetically related individuals tend to distrust one another and so do not group when enforcement depends on intrinsic motivations alone" (Barr et al., 2008; Barr and Genicot, 2008 We thus measure social networks beyond family links and focus on the relation of the family with social organizations and members of the community. In order to take into account the heterogeneity of social interaction, we distinguish between participation in (institutionalised) groups that provide economic benefits and (informal) mutual social arrangements with key members in the community (Miguel at al. 2006; Gallego and Mendola, 2010) .
An illustrative Model
A simple model illustrates and sharpens our hypotheses. The model is not meant to explain migration decisions in general terms. Rather, it is supposed to explain while the migration decisions of some groups would react to violence in South Africa more intensively than others. In our model, households are heterogeneous with respect to two characteristics; first, the number of small children, and second, access to social networks. With respect to wages in Mozambique and South Africa we assume households to be homogeneous. This is correct with respect to wages in South Africa, but is a simplification with respect to Mozambique. We will, however, take this into account in the empirical part of the paper by controlling for wealth (as reliable income data are not available).
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Consider a household which maximizes its utility over two periods. To derive predictions about the type of household members most affected by violence in South Africa, it suffices to assume that  2 U/Nw > 0 (at least for a sufficiently large wage shock).
This means that a decrease in the expected wage w will affect the utility of a family with many children more strongly than one with less young children. The idea behind the assumption is that when there is a negative wage shock, the household may not have enough income to feed its children, leading to famine, illness or death of children, which strongly affects the utility of the household. Our assumption is founded on a very simple fact. To keep a child (or any human being) healthy a minimum amount of calorie intake per day is required. A family with less children, other things equal, can adapt its consumption pattern to a change in income in a way that all children stay healthy, but a household with more children will ultimately reach the critical calorie level.
The effect of having access to a network is also quite simple: households that are in a network can get some transfer compensating in part for the wage loss. Consequently the decrease in second-period consumption will be weaker. Notice that we assume that network membership to be exogenous and that we are not concerned about investments in the network or how the transfer is paid back. We simply consider that network access can overcome (partially) the credit constraints many developing economies suffer from. We do not claim any deep theoretical insights, neither explain in general migration decisions. Rather, we try to explain heterogeneity in sensitivity of intentions to violence.
Data
The data used in our empirical analysis is based on a unique survey conducted by Gallego and With respect to migration intentions, retrospective information was asked on current migration intention (in August 2008) and past migration intention (1 year earlier) of household members. Despite the brief period of time that elapses between the time of the survey and the xenophobic attacks, which should foster a good perception of current and past intentions, we can control for a "good old times" bias and for any other aggregate shock that might affect migration intentions even in the absence of xenophobic attacks by using the same information relative to a "placebo" period (when no major occurrence had arisen). (placebo period)". Answers to migration intentions were chosen from the pre-set list of four alternatives: "no intention" "weak intention", "strong intention", "surely".
The survey instruments include socioeconomic and demographic characteristics followed by the information on migration experience and group participation. Data on migration of household members were also gathered, including information on duration and destination of migration, and whether migration involved moving costs and remittances. In addition, a community questionnaire was implemented to the community leader to collect information on the institutional and market organization, community infrastructure and social cohesion. households with different size, or households with different levels of "social networks", which we will control for in regressions.
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
Descriptive statistics for our control variables are presented in Table 6 , which reports demographics, educational attainments, wealth position, international migration experience and community characteristics. Data shows that 38% of households have a female head and the average household size is 5.4 members. If we look at the migration experience, 38% reported at least one current international migrant in the household and 27% has past migration experience.
Household wealth is measured through a synthetic asset index weighting the ownership of various durable goods and the dwelling conditions. The methodology to build the index uses principal components analysis to assign weights to the indicator (see Filmer and Prichett, 2001 ) and a large number implies better economic position of the household.
Empirical strategy
The estimation approach is based on comparing migration intentions about the periods before May 2008 and after, while controlling for differing characteristics of the household samples (from a wide range of survey demographic measurements) and differing time perception. We estimate migration intentions as follows:
where Pit is an indicator for migration intention in household i in year t (with t=August2007, August2008); T 1 is a dummy that takes the value one if the observation comes from the period after attacks (August2008), and zero otherwise; Mit measures the migration experience in the household at present and in the past.; and Xi is a vector of individual and family characteristics, including age education, household demographics, and community of residence. Standard errors will be estimated allowing for clustering at the household level as the error is serially correlated because of repeated observations for the same household.
The main identification issue of this equation estimation arises from the fact that the estimated coefficient  captures not only the effects of the attacks, but also of any other timevarying factors contemporaneous with the attacks that might have affected migrants" intention behaviour. To disentangle the effects of xenophobic attacks from any other time trend effects of the economy, besides controlling for a wide range of household and community characteristics as well as community fixed effects, we include the "placebo period effect" in the equation as follows:
where 2 T takes value one if the observation comes from the placebo period (January 2008). We expect the coefficient of this variable to be non-significant, as no major changes occurred with respect to August 2007. Yet, in order to control for migration seasonality issues, we further include as an extra control whether households experienced seasonal migration of household members.
Furthermore, we investigate whether the household sensitivity to xenophobia at destination varies systematically according to key exogenous socio-demographic characteristics. Given the issues -pointed out by Ai and Norton (2003) -in the estimation of the marginal effects of interaction variables in logistic regressions, we present marginal impact effects of heterogeneous "before-and-after estimates" across sub-samples of households. In particular, we estimate heterogeneous effects with respect to the household structure and its engagement in communitybased social networks. With respect to the former, we divide the sample into two sub-samples according to the household size and composition. With respect to social networks participation, the subsample consists of households with and without membership in community-based socioeconomic groups. Finally, we estimate heterogeneous effects across the intersection of the above mentioned sub-samples of households, as to test to what extent households" demographic attributes combined with social networks participation increase (or decrease) the cost of migration due to high risk at destination. Table 7 summarises probit regression results, where the dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the household respondent reports a positive intention to emigrate of any household member (i.e. whether the answer to migration intentions reported above is any of the following alternatives: "weak intention", "strong intention", "surely"). The dependent variable is equal to 0 if the answer is "no intention".
Results

TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
In order to directly interpret the results, we report marginal (or discrete) effects, which are the changes in the predicted probability associated with changes in the explanatory variables. In Table   7 , we begin with a restricted specification and then include household and community controls, community fixed effects and other specific controls related to the "placebo effect". Controls include:
gender, age and occupation of household head, household size, number of females and children (0-4) in the household, household ethnicity and religion, average years of schooling in the household, and a household wealth indicator. The last two variables are included also in squared terms as to allow for a potential non-linear relationship between migration intentions and the household skill and wealth position. We further include a dummy variable for urban areas and community level characteristics, such as the quality of roads, school and health facilities, formal bank and market availability. We finally rule out any unobservable community level characteristics potentially associated with variation in migration intentions and we fully focus on the within-community variation by running specifications with community fixed effects (where the community is our primary sampling unit). Including community fixed effects allow us to control for any difference across communities which might affect the level of migration, such as differences in attitudes towards migration, migration history and networks, infrastructure and labor market characteristics.
In all specifications, with both controls and community fixed effects, Mozambicans" intentions of migrating is estimated to decrease after the xenophobic shock occurred in South Africa. Adding controls for the household migration experience does not reduce the significance of the post-attack drop nor its dimension. In particular, in the less parsimonious specification, other things being equal, the average propensity to migrate after the attacks is lower than before by 4.6 percentage points ("p.p." hereafter). Importantly, the placebo period has no effect on migration intentions -while controlling also for seasonal migration experience. The community fixed effects estimates in the two last columns of Table 7 show that if there are differences in the labor market conditions as well as migration experience across communities they are ruled out by focusing on variation within communities.
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It is worth noting that there is a significant non-linear relation between the wealth index and the intention to migrate. In particular, at low levels of wealth a marginal increase in wealth raises propensity to migrate. For better-off households, instead, a marginal increase in wealth decreases migration intention. This reflects the fact that migration is both a costly and risky process, but also remunerative in terms of remittances, such that poorer households facing less credit constraints may need to migrate more than richer households 5 .
Overall Table 8 ). In addition, we run regressions differentiating households according to the number of female members as to control for the fact that while household heads are keen to insure welfare of their family, women"s labor supply at home might perform an insurance function at household
level. Yet, this is not the case as results go in same direction as above with xenophobic attacks affecting more the intention to migrate of households with many females (Panel C- Table 8 ). This reflects the strong patriarchal structure of the Mozambican society, particularly in the South of the 14 country, and the extremely low participation of women in the labor market as well as in several aspects of the local socio-economic life. We have also run robustness checks including adult children, who through their work may provide some insurance in case the household head is affected by violence, but nothing changes (see Tab A1 in Appendix). has a deterrent effect in risky migration behaviour, but if the family is "well connected" this mitigating effect disappears.
So far we have run separate regressions for household sub-samples as to allow the effect of xenophobic attacks to interact with household level characteristics. In order to test whether the difference between our heterogeneous before-and-after estimates are statistically significant, we run specifications with controls for the interactions between the xenophobic shock -as well as the placebo variable -and household level characteristics that influence both the degree of risk and insurance. Results reported in Tables A2-A5 in Appendix test the main effects of the xenophobic attacks and the household level characteristics, while also testing if the xenophobic shock has an effect on the slopes of these characteristics. Because in probit regression the interpretation of interaction effects is complicated (Ai and Norton, 2003), we only report the coefficients (not odds ratios) and concentrate on significance and direction.
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In Table A2 we test interaction effects of the xenophobic shock with household demographic characteristics, i.e. household size, number of children and number of females, using the latter as continuous (panel A) and discrete variables (panel B). The same variables are interacted with the placebo period. Table A3 adds to models in Table A2 community fixed effects as controls.
In Table A4 we test interaction effects with household group participation. Overall, compared to models in Tables 8-9 , we find consistent results for household-level variables and interaction terms.
While the main effect of the time dummy for the xenophobic shock is not significant, the time dummy interacts significantly with the three household demographic characteristics. This is to say that household demographic characteristics have a significant impact on the difference of migration intentions before and after the xenophobic shock. In particular, large households, and households with many children and females are significantly more sensitive to the xenophobic shock with respect to smaller households or families with few dependents. Households with group membership, on the other hand, are not significantly more (or less) sensitive to the xenophobic shock, whilst the latter still has a significant negative main effect on migration intentions.
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Finally Table A5 reports regression results including interaction effects of time dummies with the three groups of demographics combined with household group participation. In particular, building from models in Table 10 , we estimate an equation that allows for differences in migration intentions among four groups: small households with group membership, large households with group membership, small households with no group membership, and large households with no group membership. The estimation of a specification with three dummy variables (and one base category) allows us to assess the proportionate difference in migration intentions with respect to the base group. Results show that households with many children and no group membership are significantly more sensitive to the xenophobic shock with respect to small households with no group membership (base group)-but the same does not hold for large households with group membership, whose coefficient is not significant. This seems to suggest that the latter group of households is more protected via group membership.
Overall, the results are consistent with predictions: other things equal, violence has the smallest effects on migration intentions in households without kids and the largest on people with kids whose family is badly connected. People with kids who have a good network will be less sensitive than the ones with bad networks.
command allows to compute the correct marginal effect and significance of the interaction variable in a probit model. Results are consistent with those reported in Tables A2-A5 in Appendix (results available upon request). 7 We also test interaction effects of informal social ties as a measure of social networks, finding similar results as using household group participation (results available upon request).
Discussion
A first important question is whether networks may affect labor outcomes in South Africa. Consider that people who are better connected in Mozambique would receive higher wages. We would then measure a simple wage effect, rather than the insurance effects of social networks against the risk of death or injury of the household head. The wage effect would, however, not explain why it is particular families with young children whose migration intentions are affected by social networks.
Moreover, we know that migrants from Mozambique sell their work on the South African spot market to South Africans. (Table 11 lists the distribution of occupations among our sampled individuals employed in SA.) A second, related, question is whether being a network member could reduce the risk of being harmed in South Africa. However, it seems little convincing to believe that network membership in Mozambique could help people against street violence in South Africa, where people who would be identified as non-natives could become victim at any time during the riots.
A third concern is that people with higher levels of trust in the society as a whole participate more in social networks and also are more willing to take the risk and migrate to South Africa. If this was the case we would be capturing a spurious relation between networks and migration
intentions. Yet, this argument would entail that people"s trust should be related to both Mozambican and South African society in the same way, which is unlikely given the large differences between the two countries. And, this argument would still fail to explain why it is in particular in large families where migration intentions decrease.
On a more general level, it could be argued that social networks are not exogenous to migration behaviour. There is indeed ample evidence that immigrants" social networks in the country of destination are important, because former migrants help newcomers to settle down, while far less evidence exists on the role of group participation and social arrangements at origin (see Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2009 , for an exception). However, we have evidence that indicates that it this is not the case in Mozambique. Rather, family plays an important role on migration behaviour (see Table 12 ).
TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE
Household with migrants in our survey answered that the main source of help in the migration process was family members at origin or destination (46% for current migrants and 51% for returned migrants), followed by their own experience (34% for current migrants and 24% for returned migrants). In addition, family members give housing at destination to the new migrants (40% of current migrants live with some family members). Second, as we have included community fixed effects in our estimates, we do control for the community migration network (i.e. the proportion of former migrants in a given community), which could lower the costs of migrating and finding a job at destination (cf Massey, 1988; Massey, Goldring and Durand 1994; Dolfin and Genicot, 2006; McKenzie and Hillel Rapoport 2007) . Notice also that we do not look at the onset of the migration phenomenon in Mozambique, when social help through networks would be particularly important. Rather, migration between Mozambique and South Africa is a long-lasting and widespread phenomenon. While Mozambicans have historically been the main labour force for South African mines, most of today"s migration from Mozambique is not permanent (life cycle), but temporary or circular migration, for which the role of networks is believed to be less important (Massey, Goldring and Durand, 1994) . Table 13 ). We hence argue that group participation in Mozambique is exogenous to migration behaviour and labor market outcomes (wages) of immigrants in South Africa, as well as to the migrant"s likelihood to be hit by xenophobic attitudes in regions of destination.
Finally, by comparing migration intentions from different communities in a single one-year period (before and after exogenous xenophobic shocks), we are much less concerned about the interaction between community networks and labor market outcomes in Mozambique as well. This is so as access to groups and social networks is not an open process, but there are frictions to participation such as transactions costs, imperfect commitment, asymmetric information, lack of enforceability or any other process that limits informal social arrangements (see Fafchamps, 2002 , Ligon et al., 2002 . Thus, we can rule out the possibility that households start joining networks at origin due to xenophobic attacks at destination over such a short period of time.
Concluding Remarks
We Robust standard errors clustered at housheold levels in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Notes: (a) The dependent variable is a discrete variable equal to 1 if the household respondent reports a positive intention of emigration (0 otherwise 
Low (<4)
High ( Notes: (a) The dependent variable is a discrete variable equal to 1 if the household respondent reports a positive intention of emigration (0 otherwise). (b) Control variables are: Seasonal migration experience, Female HH head, Age of HH head, Age of HH head squared, HH size, Number of females in the HH, Number of children in the HH (<5years-old), Average hh years of schooling, Average hh years of schooling squared, HH head occupation-farmer, Wealth index, Wealth index squared, Ethnicity, Religion, Urban area, Community characteristics (paved-road, primary school, Bank, market, health facility). (c) We distinguish between 'low' and 'high' sub-groups by using always the first two and the last two quantiles of all demographic variable distribution.
Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Panel C: N females
Notes: (a) The dependent variable is a discrete variable equal to 1 if the household respondent reports a positive intention of emigration (0 otherwise). (b) Control vars are as in Table 8 . (c) We distinguish between 'low' and 'high' sub-groups by using always the first two and the last two quantiles of all demographic variable distribution. Table 8 . (c) We distinguish between 'low' and 'high' sub-groups by using always the first two and the last two quantiles of all demographic variable distribution. Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
